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Abstract Grid computing systems require innovative meth-
ods and tools to identify cybersecurity incidents and per-
form autonomous actions i.e. without administrator inter-
vention. They also require methods to isolate and trace job
payload activity in order to protect users and find evidence
of malicious behavior. We introduce an integrated approach
of security monitoring via Security by Isolation with Linux
Containers and Deep Learning methods for the analysis of
real time data in Grid jobs running inside virtualized High-
Throughput Computing infrastructure in order to detect and
prevent intrusions. A dataset for malware detection in Grid
computing is described. We show in addition the utilization
of generative methods with Recurrent Neural Networks to
improve the collected dataset. We present Arhuaco, a pro-
totype implementation of the proposed methods. We empir-
ically study the performance of our technique. The results
show that Arhuaco outperforms other methods used in In-
trusion Detection Systems for Grid Computing. The study
is carried out in the ALICE Collaboration Grid, part of the
Worldwide LHC Computing Grid.
Keywords Grid Computing Security · Intrusion Detection
and Prevention · Deep Learning · WLCG · Isolation ·
Malware Detection
1 Introduction
The Worldwide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG) is one the
most remarkable examples of High-Troughput Computing
(HTC) distributed infrastructure for scientific applications.
A. Gomez Ramirez ( ) · C. Lara · D. Bilanovic · U. Kebschull
IRI group, Goethe-University Frankfurt
E-mail: andres.gomez@cern.ch
L. Betev
CERN, Geneva, Switzerland
The WLCG is the global Grid that analyzes data from the
Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN, with 170 sites in
40 countries. Due to their size, complexity, reputation and
required access by Internet these systems are continuously
exposed to attackers. Authenticated users have the freedom
to execute arbitrary code and to transfer arbitrary data that
is required for their experiments. External or insider attack-
ers may take advantage of the Grid functionality to carry out
unauthorized activities such as running malware or mining
cryptocoins. The Grid is a heterogeneous and dynamic en-
vironment where it is difficult to adapt traditional rule based
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).
The distributed usage of High-throughput Computing
(HTC) farms for data processing tasks - known as Grid
Computing - has been very successful in High Energy
Physics (HEP), weather forecasting, brain research and as-
tronomy research, just to mention a few examples. Scientists
can submit jobs composed of custom code and experimental
data. The computing Grid has been envisioned as an analogy
for the electrical Grid, for computing resources on demand.
The Worldwide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG) enables the
scientists to analyze massive amounts of physics data and
it allowed for the experimental validation of the existence
of the Higgs boson [10]. The WLCG integrates computer
centers worldwide that provide computing and storage re-
source into a single infrastructure accessible by all Large
Hadron Collider (LHC) physicists. Currently, it combines
the power of nearly 170 sites in 40 countries, connected with
10-100 Gb links, with more than 600.000 processing cores
and 700 PB of storage capacity. It is capable of process-
ing more than 2 million jobs per day. The ALICE (A Large
Ion Collider Experiment) Collaboration has built a dedicated
detector to exploit the unique physics potential of nucleus-
nucleus collisions at LHC energies. Its aim is to study the
physics of strongly interacting matter at the highest energy
densities reached so far in the laboratory [12]. As a mem-
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ber of the WLCG, the ALICE experiment has developed the
ALICE production environment (AliEn) [3], implementing
many components of the Grid computing technologies that
are needed to store, process and analyze the collected data.
Through AliEn, the computing centers that provide CPU and
storage resources for ALICE can be seen and used as a sin-
gle entity - any available node executes jobs and file access is
transparent to the user, wherever in the world a file might be
located. Figure 1 represents the flow of data in the WLCG.
Fig. 1 Real time grid data flow around the world
Authorized users of Grid computing systems have the
freedom to carry out research on experimental data. They
are able to execute arbitrary code and transfer any required
data. This means that potential insider attackers have the
same capabilities. The focus of this study is on the security
issues related to the Grid job execution environment inside
site worker nodes. Frequently in HEP Grids [5], the jobs run-
ning in the worker nodes have access rights that are beyond
of what is actually required, restricted only by one or sev-
eral local Linux accounts. When multiple jobs are executed
with the same account, an attacker with control over one job
could tamper another user jobs, blaming the owner of any
malicious activity. These processes could also have access
to sensitive server data and restricted networks. Therefore,
Security by Isolation (SbI) mechanisms for processes and
networks are important requirements for Grid computing.
An insider attacker may misuse the power of the Grid
for activities not related to physics data analysis. Complex
HTC infrastructure such as WLCG are attractive targets for
external attackers as well. An attacker might take advantage
of the Grid functionality to tamper with user jobs, escalate
privileges, access sensitive server configuration data, setup
a Denial of Service (DoS) attack or mine cryptocoins, to
name a few of the possibilities. This could be accomplished
by exploiting unknown or unfixed software or hardware vul-
nerabilities, listen to user network traffic to gather sensitive
clear text information or by guessing weak user credentials
among other possibilities. Millions of jobs might be running
in Grids like the WLGC every day. The user’s ability to run
arbitrary code and the lack of proper isolation make detect-
ing intrusions a more challenging task than in other systems.
Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) require rules
written by security professionals. Those rules need to be up-
dated constantly which requires an important amount of ef-
fort. Rule based IDS are difficult to adapt to very dynamic
environments such as the Grid [18]. Machine Learning al-
gorithms can help to automate the way IDS are built and up-
dated, by using security monitoring data collected from the
protected systems [60]. In the Grid, the amount of this mon-
itoring data is huge due to the number of running jobs. Deep
Learning methods may help to analyze this data to improve
the IDS detection accuracy.
We introduce Arhuaco, a framework that adopts Linux
Container (LC) technology to provide SbI and security mon-
itoring by applying Deep Learning for detection and pre-
vention of abnormal activities based on multiple sources of
monitoring data such as network connections and system
calls. Arhuaco gives researches the ability to generate com-
plementary training data by a Recurrent Neural Network.
This can be used to improve the detection performance and
adapt the detector to new environments. A dataset for Ma-
chine Learning (ML) training of malware detection on Linux
based Grid computing is described. Some of the most popu-
lar Grid systems are just starting to explore the usage of SbI
and IDS for security monitoring [65]. As we describe in the
related work section there are no studies that leverage the
capabilities of Linux Container isolation and monitoring in
combination with Deep Learning and data generation for In-
trusion Detection. We also show in the next section that there
is no tool implementing the mentioned techniques for Grid
job payload monitoring in order to detect intrusions. We de-
scribe the design, implementation decisions and tests of our
proposed methods in the ALICE Collaboration Grid, part of
the WLCG. We demonstrate that the selected algorithms and
techniques outperform other methods used on IDS for Grid
Computing.
This document is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the state of the art on ML and isolation based secu-
rity methods applied to distributed environments especially
in Grid computing. Section 3 provides background informa-
tion on the SbI approach and an overview of the classifica-
tion task in Machine Learning and generative models. Sec-
tion 4 and 5 describe the Arhuaco design and implemen-
tation based on our ideas. Section 6 shows the results ob-
tained from testing our approach. Finally section 7 and 8
summarize our findings and indicate directions of our future
research.
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2 Related work
2.1 Security by Isolation in Grid Computing
Virtual Machines (VM) have been suggested many times
to solve the isolation problems in Grid computing [20].
VMs are emulated machines with their own kernel while
Linux Containers (LC) can share a single kernel. Several
researchers - [18] and [17] - have proposed the usage of
LCs to provide a level of isolation between the Grid jobs
and the underlying system and network. Saving system re-
sources in High-throughput Computing (HTC) applications
is critical, and LC help to reduce the overall performance
impact. [67] presents a comparison of the performance of
several virtualization technologies including VM, and shows
that container based systems have a near-native performance
of CPU, memory, disk and network. [49] analyzes LCs and
VMs and finds similar results in terms of performance and
scalability. [7] shows a success real experience for LCs pro-
viding isolation in a Grid site at the ALICE High Level Trig-
ger (HLT). Our study further extends this direction. In par-
ticular, we are interested in how this isolation mechanism
can be integrated with a security monitoring system, that
provides methods to enforce Intrusion Prevention and De-
tection in Grid computing.
2.2 Intrusion Detection
In [29] an extensive review of Intrusion Detection Systems
is presented. Intrusion is defined as the attempt to compro-
mise confidentiality, integrity and availability and Intrusion
Detection as the process of monitoring the events occurring
in a computer system or network, and analyzing them for
signs of intrusions. The cited study presents several open
source technologies as the most used solutions for IDS such
as SNORT [44] and OSSEC [21]. False positive and false
negative are two very common metrics to assess the degree
of accuracy. Relevant features can be sets of audit trails (e.g.
system logs, system commands) on a host, network pack-
ets or connections, wireless network traffic and application
logs.
Machine Learning has been proposed in many studies to
improve IDS. [60] summarizes the state of the art on ML
techniques applied to Intrusion Detection and prevention. It
states that the most commonly used techniques in the topic
have been K-nearest neighbor (K-NN), Support Vector Ma-
chines (SVM), Artificial Neural Networks, self-organizing
maps, decision trees, Naı¨ve Bayes networks, genetic algo-
rithms and fuzzy logic for one single classifier approaches.
On the other hand for hybrid classifiers, using several clas-
sifiers, neuro-fuzzy techniques, clustering-based approaches
have been used especially for parameter tunning and clas-
sification. Single classifiers with K-NN and SVM are very
popular, mainly the second one. For hybrid approaches an
integrated framework, where a method is used for feature
selection while another method is used for classification is
common. KDD99 [45] is presented as the standard database
for testing ML based IDS. [66] shows an overview on the
usage of computational intelligence research on IDS. Ac-
cording to the review, misuse detection approach is widely
adopted in the majority of commercial systems, because it is
simple and effective, but it can not detect novel or targeted
attacks. The other common method is anomaly detection. It
extracts patterns from behavioral habits of end users, or us-
age history of networks and hosts. In the intrusion detection
field, supervised learning usually produces classifiers for
misuse detection from class labeled training datasets. Un-
supervised learning satisfies the requirement of anomaly de-
tection, hence it is usually employed in anomaly detection.
The authors present two benchmarks, the DARPA-Lincoln
datasets [31] and the KDD99 datasets [45] as the most uti-
lized. According to their work, the most commonly used
algorithms are Neural Networks like Feed forward Neural
Networks, Radial basis function neural networks, Recurrent
Neural Networks, Self-organizing maps and Adaptive reso-
nance theory.
2.3 Methods used in Grid related Intrusion Detection
There are previously proposed methods for IDS in Grid
computing. Some of them describe schemes that are not re-
lated to Machine Learning nor computational intelligence.
For example [58] employs a relational grid monitoring ar-
chitecture, [14] presents a bottleneck verification approach,
[50] describes a streaming database approach, [61] utilizes
gossip algorithms, [69] represents a multi-agent approach,
and [34] introduces a web services correlation service. On
the other hand, some articles are focused on ML topics such
as [59], that adopts learning vector quantization Neural Net-
works, [47] and [62] utilize feed forward Neural Networks,
[25] applies auto immune systems and [57] also makes use
of learning vector quantization neural networks, all of them
with a single classifier approach. [68] utilizes a hybrid ap-
proach, with a soft computing based self-organize map di-
mension reduction technique, a fuzzy Neural Network and a
genetic algorithm.
None of the previously presented studies applies Secu-
rity by Isolation to further improve security incident de-
tection. Neither of them makes use of Deep Learning ap-
proaches that allow researchers processing huge real time
streams of data produced in Grids like the WLCG. In addi-
tion, we could not find the usage of generative methods by
Recurrent Neural Networks to improve the training datasets.
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2.4 Grid IDS related datasets
Grid computing is a unique environment with special re-
quirements. We analyze the behavior of the job payloads.
Therefore, using standard datasets for ML based IDS could
be ineffective. We could not find any available dataset for
IDS training in Grid computing. However several studies
describe custom metrics employed. In [58] and [50], the au-
thors generate a dataset consisting of one or more log files.
[14] uses an operating system kernel module to gather sys-
tem calls. In [47] the measurements are extracted from au-
dit data of low level IDS. To identify misuse committed by
insider attackers, their system analyzes the behavior by re-
source usage data like CPU time and memory usage. The
authors gather audit data from HIDS, also extracting operat-
ing system data throughout the grid middleware and the sys-
log protocol. In the implementation level they use OSSEC-
HIDS and Snort. [61] uses Snort alerts as the input met-
rics by the intrusion detection exchange protocol. [25] pro-
poses user-level data built from user ID, role, type and quan-
tity of resources being consumed, and system-level data is
composed of CPU usage rate, states of main and the sec-
ondary memory and attributes of system files. The identi-
fication, type, priority, status of processes and the states of
CPU when they are running are organized into process-level
data. IP address and port number of source and destination,
type of protocol, flags are grouped into network-level data.
[69] analyses the network log data of its own monitoring
area. In [68] the extracted features are system calls (ID, re-
turn value, return status), process (ID, IPC ID, IPC permis-
sion, exit value, exit status) and file access (mode, path, file
system, file name, argument length). The extracted informa-
tion is normalized between 0 and 1 for the input of SOM.
[57] describes a method using generated log files as a host
based intrusion detection. None of the mentioned datasets
was made publicly available for other researchers, therefore
we decided to collect our own dataset.
2.5 Malware Detection
The focus of this study is to run Grid jobs securely and an-
alyze the payloads behavior in order to detect intrusions.
Therefore, we use Linux malware samples to test our en-
vironment and collect a dataset of malicious data. This is
a more practical approach than creating our own set of bi-
naries with a limited set of malicious characteristics. There
are several web sites that collect malware samples and make
them available for the research community such as [63] and
[64]. In the same direction [42] and [43] explore Machine
Learning for malware classification, using system calls as
main features for their classifier. [15] explores the usage of
Deep Learning for static analysis of malware samples for
classification. We use a similar approach, however, our goal
is to provide real time misbehave detection in Grid comput-
ing, by analyzing huge flows of data that can be generated
by the millions of jobs running in the Grid.
3 Background
3.1 Security by Isolation
Security by Isolation is a technique that enforces component
separation (hardware or software) in a way that if one of
them is compromised by an attacker, other components still
remain safe [30]. There are several implementations provid-
ing SbI such as Virtual Machines, Linux containers and the
Unix multiuser scheme. There are even security focused Op-
eration Systems [48] built with SbI as one of their core fea-
tures such as [54], [37] and [51].
3.2 Linux Containers
An LC is a set of processes running on top of a shared kernel
[67]. They are isolated from the rest of the machine and can
not affect the host or other containers, with the exception of
exploitable vulnerabilities in the kernel or the container en-
gine. It takes advantage of namespaces to have a private view
of the system (network interfaces, PID tree, mount points).
Cgroups are also applied to have a limited assignment of re-
sources. LC can be seen as an extension of the virtual mem-
ory space concept to a wide system scope. They provide a
set of features that have advantages over other virtualization
technologies. They are lightweight, fast on booting, have
a small memory footprint, and close to bare metal perfor-
mance. Figure 2 describes a set containers working together,
isolated and sharing the same kernel. In opposition, Virtual
Machines have several kernels on top of a hypervisor.
Fig. 2 Linux Containers on top of a common kernel
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3.3 Machine Learning for data classification
ML is a form of applied mathematics [19] that tries to model
how human intelligence works. One of its common applica-
tion is the statistic estimation of complicated functions. ML
is frequently applied in automatic classification of complex
data, a task that traditionally has been carried out by human
operators. We can define classification in ML as follows: the
input data x is a vector of d elements x = (x1, ...,xd) ∈ Rd
called a feature vector. To classify the input x means to eval-
uate a classification function CW : Rd 7→ {c1, ...,ck} on x.
The output is ck∗ = CW (x), where k∗ ∈ {1...k}; ck∗ is the
class to which x corresponds, based on the modelW [9]. Dif-
ferent ML algorithms use different ways to find the model
W . We can assume a simple two classes decision problem,
defined as:
C(x) =WTφ(x)+b, (1)
where b is a bias parameter and φ(x) is a feature-space
transformation. The training dataset corresponds to N in-
put vectors x1, . . . ,xN , with target values c1, . . . ,ck where
cn ∈ {normal,malicious}. The objective is normally defined
as a loss function L that represents the penalty for mis-
matching the training data. The loss L (W ) on parameters
W is the average of the loss over the training examples
x1, . . . ,xN , as:
L (W ) =
1
N∑i
L (W,xi). (2)
Training consists of finding the parameters W that result in
an acceptably small loss, in the best case the smallest one
(global minimum).
3.4 Support Vector Machines (SVM)
SVM are very popular for automated classification in Intru-
sion Detection Systems [60]. We use them to compare the
classification performance of our proposed Convolutional
Neural Networks. SVM use hyperplane decision classifiers
in a similar way to traditional perceptrons. However, the op-
timization objective is to maximize the margin, defined as
the distance between the decision boundary and the train-
ing data that are closest to that hyperplane [39]. For Support
Vector Machines the model W is made of k vectors in Rd
where W = {wi}ki=1. Here our objective is to optimize the
parameters W and b such as:
cn(WTφ(xn)+b)≥ 1,n= 1, . . . ,N. (3)
The optimization problem can be expressed in a simpler way
as:
argmin
w,b
1
2
||W ||2. (4)
3.5 Deep Learning
DL is a sub area of Machine Learning that has solved in-
creasingly complicated applications with increasing accu-
racy [19]. Deep Learning architectures such as Convolu-
tional Neural Networks (CNN), Deep Belief Networks and
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) have been utilized in
computer vision, speech recognition, natural language pro-
cessing, among other areas. They have produced some re-
sults comparable or even superior to human experts [46].
CNNs were first proposed by [38]. They are similar to tradi-
tional Neural Networks but they use a convolution operation
in one of the layers instead of matrix operations. They are es-
pecially useful for time series data and grid-like data topolo-
gies and have been very successful in practical applications
such as image classification and were recently proposed for
text classification [26]. Figure 3 shows a diagram of a Con-
volutional Neural Network using sliding filters to analyze
text (System calls) input data, where the convolution is ap-
plied in the first layer. A discrete convolution operation in
Deep Learning can be defined as:
s(t) = (x∗w)(t) =
∞
∑
a=−∞
x(a)w(t−a), (5)
where x is an input measurement on time index t, a is the age
of a measurement, w is a weighting function (also known as
the kernel) that depends on the age of measurement.
Subsequent layers in CNN are normally composed of
classical Deep Neural Network full connected neurons.
They are usually made of a higher amount of hidden layers,
which require special kinds of methods for updating their
neuron values. Sigmoid and rectified linear units (ReLUs)
are common activation functions φ(x) used by CNN.
3.6 Generative Models
Traditional Machine Learning models used for classification
employ a discriminative approach, they process input data
and give a probabilistic membership value to a certain class.
On the other hand, there are ML methods that try to learn
the probability distribution function that generates the train-
ing data (input data space) [19]. Those methods are called
generative and are useful in practical applications to create
or simulate new training data. These methods have been re-
cently used for instance to create new images from huge pre-
vious image datasets.
Recurrent Neural Networks have been used as genera-
tive methods with important success in applications. Long
Short Term Memory (LSTM) networks were chosen in this
research. LSTM networks have an explicit memory cell and
are able to capture long-term dependences in sequential
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Fig. 3 A Convolutional Network for text like data processing
data. Formally they can be defined as the following set of
equations:
ft = σg(Wf xt +U f ht−1+b f ),
it = σg(Wixt +Uiht−1+bi),
ot = σg(Woxt +Uoht−1+bo),
ct = ft ◦ ct−1+ it ◦σc(Wcxt +Ucht−1+bc),
ht = ot ◦σh(ct),
(6)
where xt is the input vector at a given iteration t, ht is an
output vector, ct is a cell state. W and U are parameter ma-
trices and b a bias vector. ft , it and ot are gate vectors, ft is
a forget gate vector, it is the input gate vector. Finally, ot is
the output gate vector. Further, we give more details on how
we have adapted the LSTM network to our training data.
4 System design
In this study, we propose the integrated usage of Security
by Isolation (SbI) with Linux containers and Deep Learning
methods to analyze real time monitoring data of processes
running inside virtualized HTC infrastructure, as well as the
utilization of generative methods to improve the required
training data. We introduce a hybrid supervised classifica-
tion approach using word2vec for feature selection and pre-
processing and Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) for
discrimination between normal and malicious classes. Our
study also employs Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) for
data generation on the training steps. Arhuaco was designed
as a proof of concept implementation based on this proposed
methods, with focus on Grid computing. Therefore it is de-
signed to provide security with a Grid based threat model
approach based on the one introduced in [18]. This can be
applied to other types of distributed HTC environments. In
a computing Grid, an adversary may have several goals:
– Steal sensitive data such as private encryption keys,
user’s certificates, tokens or credentials.
– Compromise user’s machines to distribute malware and
steal valuable user information.
– Carry out a Denial of Service attacks.
– Abuse the Grid computational resources for criminal or
not allowed activities, for instance, to deploy botnets or
mining crypto-coins.
– Damage the organization reputation by using resources
to attack other organizations.
To achieve these goals, an attacker could use several
methods:
– Exploit unknown or not fixed software/hardware vulner-
abilities.
– Listen to user network to gather sensitive clear text in-
formation.
– Perform a man in the middle attack.
– Tamper with user’s jobs.
– Escalate privileges.
– Access sensitive server configuration data.
In the next subsections, a detailed information about the
design and implementation of Arhuaco is given, based on
our proposed contributions. We also describe how our sys-
tem works under the described threat model.
4.1 Linux Containers for Isolation
We require an isolation technology easily adaptable to the
Linux powered Grid computing for High Energy Physics
(HEP). Linux Containers (LC) were selected to provide SbI
given their security vs performance balance [13]. LCs pro-
vide in addition a very important feature, network isolation.
They make it possible to create an encrypted virtual net-
works inside a physical or another virtual network, in order
to restrict processes running inside to access sensitive assets.
This is fundamental in Grid computing, where sites may be
Arhuaco: Deep Learning and Isolation Based Security for Distributed High-Throughput Computing 7
sharing resources with other projects or experimental infras-
tructure. For instance, there is a Grid site at the ALICE HLT
cluster, sharing physical resources with the sensitive LHC
experiment network [6]. Therefore virtual network isolation
is used to avoid breaches. Another fundamental feature of
Linux Containers for our this study is the monitoring power
they grant. Since it is possible to encapsulate a set of pro-
cesses with their own view of the entire system, it is also
possible to capture specific per process metrics that allow
us to analyze their isolated behavior. We are able to capture
resource consumption data such as CPU, memory and disk,
network connection data, and system calls for a specific con-
tainer and as a consequence for each Grid job. Therefore,
we can detect with better precision the source of a security
incident or even collect forensics data for further analysis.
Figure 4 is a schema of the desired isolation characteristics.
On the left, Grid jobs run without isolation, being able to af-
fect other jobs or the underlying system. On the right, Grid
jobs are isolated by LCs, each one of them run in a reduced
version of the whole system, so they have no access to other
jobs or sensitive resources in the working nodes.
Fig. 4 Desired isolation scenario
Traditional Grid systems use batch engines such as Con-
dor [55] for scheduling jobs in distributed environments. To
run containers instead of standard batch jobs, we need mod-
ern orchestration tools that concede us the ability to exe-
cute containers over a shared cluster. There are several pop-
ular alternatives including Google Kubernetes [41], Apache
Mesos [22], and Docker Swarm [32]. In the system im-
plementation section, we describe the reason for selecting
Docker Swarm to be the first container engine that Arhuaco
interacts with.
4.2 Deep Learning for Grid job classification
Popular industrial IDS such as Snort and OSSEC [44] and
[21] use fixed rules and search for known attack signatures
in order to find possible attacks. They have problems when
unknown or slightly different intrusion methods are em-
ployed, so they need to be constantly updated [27]. Machine
Learning has been commonly suggested in Intrusion Detec-
tion for the modeling and analysis of log and network data
for autonomous classification of security incidents. As de-
picted in Figure 5, in this research we apply dynamic analy-
sis of Grid jobs monitoring data for real time intrusion detec-
tion, which means analysis of operation system (Linux) pro-
cesses. A supervised classification approach is implemented
in Arhuaco. We propose the usage of a Convolutional Neu-
ral Network architecture based on the one introduced in [26]
for English sentences classification and utilized in [15] for
static binary file classification according to their x86 ma-
chine code instructions.
Fig. 5 Flow of Grid data processing for classification
4.3 Feature extraction
As mentioned before, this study employs system calls and
network connection traces as input data. They are encoded
in a human readable format, thus Natural Language Pro-
cessing (NLP) methods allow us to build a convenient lan-
guage model. Recently introduced Deep Learning methods
for NLP implement learning word vector representations by
neural language models [4]. In these vectors, words are pro-
jected from a 1− o f −V encoding, where V is the number
of different words available (vocabulary size), in a lower di-
mensional vector space using Neural Network hidden lay-
ers [26]. Therefore, semantically close words in the train-
ing corpus are mathematically close in the lower dimen-
sional vector space. The word2vec algorithm [16] was cho-
sen for Arhuaco to create the input features. It is a predic-
tive model for learning word embeddings. Word2vec vectors
create suitable inputs for Convolutional Neural Networks
since they allow to treat input data as matrices, similar to
the array of pixels in an image. Here we refer to tokens in-
stead of words since our dataset can also contain numbers,
paths, IP addresses, among other type of data.
As a preprocessing step for the traces, characters that do
not increase the amount of available information are deleted.
Each trace line of system calls is composed of the type of op-
eration, the opcode number and all its parameters. For net-
work connection information each line has the DNS request,
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IP addresses and ports used per connection. These lines have
a variable size, therefore we take only the first m tokens per
line, adding a padding token when a line is shorter. Then l
consecutive lines are taken, which gives us a sequence of
n= m× l total tokens, from which we extract our input fea-
ture vector. ai ∈ Rk is a k-dimensional token vector corre-
sponding to the i-th token in our sequence. This sequence
can be described as:
a1:n = a1⊕a2⊕ . . .⊕an, (7)
where ⊕ is the concatenation operator, and ai:i+ j is the con-
catenation of tokens ai,ai+1, ...,ai+ j. These embedding vec-
tors are the result of applying word2vec method on our text
input data.
4.4 Convolutional Neural Network
In the context of this research, a convolution operation in-
volves a kernel or filter G ∈ Rhk, which is applied to a win-
dow of h tokens to produce a new feature. For example, a
feature zi is generated from a window of words ai:i+h−1 by:
zi = f (G ·ai:i+h−1+b), (8)
where b ∈ R is a bias term and f is a non-linear function.
This filter is applied to each possible window of tokens in
the sequence {a1:h,a2:h+1, ...,an−h+1:n} to produce a feature
vector z= [z1,z2, ...,zn−h+1], with z ∈ Rn−h+1. A max-over-
time pooling operation is then applied to the feature vector,
taking the maximum value z∗ =maxz as the only feature re-
sulting from this filter. The most important feature, one with
the highest value, is kept for each feature map. The same
process is repeated with multiple filters of different window
sizes, to obtain multiple features. These features are passed
to a fully connected ReLu layer whose output goes to the
last dense layer with Sigmoid activation with outputs corre-
sponding to the probability distribution over labels (normal
and malicious in our problem setup).
For the contrasted classification method - the Support
Vector Machine (SVM) - we used the well established Bag
of Words (BoW) model [39] to create its input feature vec-
tors. In the BoW we first create a vocabulary with the list
of all possible tokens is the training set. Then we reduce this
vocabulary by using only the most used tokens. We created a
vector where each component is the number of times a given
token appears in the analyzed set. An alternative method is
the Continuous Bag of Words (CBOW), which predicts tar-
get words from source context words.
4.5 Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) for training data
generation
A character level language model has been selected as a gen-
erative method for Arhuaco. The objective of this model is
to predict the next character in a sequence. Given a training
corpus (c1, ...,cT ), where ci is a single character and T is
the total number of characters. A Long Short Term Mem-
ory (LSTM) RNN is utilized to determine the sequence of
its output vectors (o1, ...,oT ) by a sequence of distributions
P(ct+1|c ≤ t) = σ(ot). Here σ is the so f tmax distribution
defined by:
P(σ(ot) = j) =
exp(o jt )
∑k exp(okt )
. (9)
The objective function is to maximize the total log proba-
bility of the training sequence ∑T−1t=0 logP(xt+1|x ≤ t). This
implies that the LSTM learns a probability distribution over
sequences. We can then sample from the conditional distri-
bution P(xt+1|x≤ t) to get the next character in a generated
string and provide it as the next input to the LSTM [52].
After the training process has finished we can generate new
data that can be used as extra training data in order to ex-
tend the generalization capabilities of a classification system
[15].
4.6 Arhuaco design architecture
A diagram of Arhuaco architectural components is shown in
Figure 6. The execution engine provides an interface with a
selected container scheduling engine according to configu-
ration parameters. Then, the executed containers are mon-
itored, extracting real time data for security analysis. The
data is processed by the previously described feature ex-
traction mechanism. Furthermore, these preprocessed input
feature vectors are sent to the classification and generative
modules. They can provide feedback to each other. Any sus-
picious incident is processed by the response engine. This
can be configured with predefined actions, such as sending
alerts to administrators, stopping suspicious jobs, or collect
information for offline analysis (forensic).
5 Implementation
The Arhuaco prototype was developed in Python. It pro-
vides interfaces for Grid frameworks, container engines and
data collection tools. Among the alternatives for Linux Con-
tainer engines, to the most popular belong Docker [32],
Rocket [33], Singularity [28], and LXC [8]. Arhuaco sup-
ports Docker in its first stage, given its broad adoption in
industrial applications and its default security measures. To
be able to execute grid jobs inside LCs, three solutions were
tested: Kubernetes [41], Apache Mesos [23], and Docker
Swarm. Docker Swarm was chosen due to its simplicity
and fast deployment in testing environments. In addition, it
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Fig. 6 Proposed Arhuaco design architecture
provides out of the box encrypted virtual networking. Fur-
ther, we may create interfaces with other container sched-
uler engines. A testing ALICE Grid site based on AliEn
[3], the ALICE Grid middelware, was deployed in a local
Linux cluster at the Goethe University in Frankfurt. It has
5 Ubuntu 14.04 nodes. A custom CentOS 6 based Docker
image and an AliEn interface for Docker Swarm were de-
veloped. CVMFS [2] was installed on the hosts and shared
as a volume inside the AliEn containers to grant access to
High Energy Physcics libraries. One job per container is ex-
ecuted by design, which is useful to increase the traceability
between different jobs. Besides, it is the natural micro ser-
vice model for Linux Containers.
For the training and validation of our proposed classifi-
cation and generative algorithms, a dataset composed of nor-
mal and malicious system call and network connection logs
was collected. Instead of creating our own set of malicious
binary samples we have used a set of 10.000 Linux malware
samples downloaded from a security research web site [63].
This allows us to cover a bigger range of malicious activi-
ties that would be very time consuming and error prone to
do manually. Regular Grid jobs were also collected from the
ALICE Grid production environment, using our test Frank-
furt site, to improve the training data. We ran the samples
and collected the same set of metrics for both types of bina-
ries. We executed them inside containers and used the iso-
lation and monitoring features to collect every system call
and network connection. These are some examples of the
collected data:
Table 1 Full preprocessed available datasets
Dataset Normal Malware
System call 12GB
127’100.000
lines
8.2GB - 127’054.763 lines
Network 868KB
20.733 lines
108KB - 2.937
Table 2 Used training and validation data after feature extraction
Dataset Training Validation
System calls traces 10’000.000 100.000
Network traces 20.000 2.000
Malware:
* IP.x IP.y irc.qeast.net 1 C_INTERNET ...
* file open fd 4 name /etc/passwd ...
Grid job:
* IP.z IP.w alice-disk-se.gridka.de 1 ...
* file access res 2 ENOENT
name /cvmfs/alice.cern.ch/x86 ...
We utilized Sysdig [53] for collecting system calls and
Bro IDS [36] for network connection data. For executing
the malware samples a testing environment without Internet
access was deployed, using Inetsim [24] for network con-
nection emulation. We have also employed Cuckoo sandbox
[35] to isolate and monitor these runs. Table 1 shows a sum-
mary of the collected dataset. In the Arhuaco online setup,
once the training is finished, the system call and network
traces collection is done in real time, as well as the classifi-
cation.
Table 2 shows a summary of the obtained samples af-
ter the feature selection step. A representation of the imple-
mented test as part of the ALICE Grid can be seen in Figure
7.
Fig. 7 Proof of concept diagram in the ALICE GRID
We have implemented the Deep Convolutional Neural
Network (CNN), Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Re-
current LSTM Neural Network by using the Python library
Keras [11] with Theano [56] as a backend. Keras simpli-
fies the development of Deep Learning algorithms and pro-
vides parallel computing capabilities powered by Theano.
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Table 3 Custom CNN parameters
Parameter System calls Network
Embedding dimension 20 10
Filter sizes 3, 4, 5 2, 3
Total number filters 20 3
Optimization function SGD
Learning rate 0.001
Momentum 0.80
Decay 10e−6
Table 4 Shared SVM and CNN parameters
Dataset m l n
System call 7 6 42
Network 5 1 5
It also supports TensorFlow [1]. It is convenient for High-
throughput Computing (HTC) applications, since it can
share resources with other applications running in parallel,
and it is strongly focused on using GPU to increase the par-
allel processing performance. Another Python library, Gen-
sim [40] was employed for word2vec extraction of embed-
ding vectors. Due to the huge size of the training corpus, it
has the functionality to deal with data that does not fit in
main memory.
The CNN hyper-parameters have been selected by an
empiric grid search. They are listed in Table 3. We use mo-
mentum and parameter decay to ensure the model conver-
gence, and dropout to prevent overfitting. For the Support
Vector Machine, we chose the Hinge loss function and the
Adadelta optimizer. The parameters m, l and n described in
the previous section are shared among the two models. They
are listed in Table 4. These last parameters were selected to
keep a good balance between the classification accuracy of
normal and malicious classes and the ability to detect in-
trusions in real time. For the LSTM Network, the chosen
optimizer is Root Mean Square Propagation, with a learning
rate of 0.01, and a categorical cross entropy as loss function.
6 Evaluation
In this section, an empiric evaluation of the performance im-
pact, classification ability and data generation effectiveness
for the methods implemented in Arhuaco is described. Here
the goal was to answer the following questions:
– Does using LC for isolation and system call monitoring
create a big performance impact? If that is the case, is it
critical in comparison to the increment in security pro-
vided?
– Does the CNN for classification of job traces provide
better accuracy and false positives rates than the tradi-
tional SVM?
– Does the LSTM Network for data generation improve
the training results?
6.1 Evaluation methods
We have deployed two type of performance tests. The first
with the Linpack benchmark as introduced in [13] to test the
throughput. The second measures the performance impact
in processing times. For the first test, we ran Linpack jobs
while for the secong the job is a production ALICE script.
We have prepared 3 evaluation scenarios: running jobs on
a Linux machine, then in Docker containers and finally in
Docker containers with system call interception and pro-
cessing by Arhuaco. In our performance analysis, the impact
of collecting network data from the job is not measured.
Loss, Accuracy (ACC) and False Positive Rate (FPR) are
the measurements for the correctness of the compared clas-
sification methods. The overall performance of the trained
classifiers is evaluated by the Accuracy. This measures the
number of instances that were correct, which are both the
True Positives and True Negatives, over the entire size of the
dataset, which is the number of True Positives (TP), True
Negatives (TN), False Positives (FP), and False Negatives
(FN). It is calculated as:
Accuracy(ACC) =
(TP+TN)
(TP+TN+FP+FN)
, (10)
FalsePositiveRate(FPR) =
FP
FP+TN
, (11)
where False Positives (FP) is the number of misclassified in-
stances of a certain category over the number of all instances
that are classified as that category. The ACC and FPR values
are defined in the range [0,1], where 1 is the best possible
value for ACC and the worst for FPR. On the other hand, 0 is
the best value for FPR and the worst for ACC. They can also
be interpreted as percentage values in the range [0%,100%].
6.2 Performance impact results
The performance evaluations were carried out in our Frank-
furt testing Grid site. Each of the 5 machines has identical
configuration: 4 Intel Xeon (64 bit) processors for a total
16 cores running at 2.27 GHz and 16 GB RAM. They all
have Ubuntu 14.04 as the installed operating system. The
container images are derived from CentOS 6, since this is
the current recommended distribution to be used with the
CERN HEP Grid libraries.
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Table 5 Performance impact in throughput measurement
s Setup Linpack (GFLOPS)
Native 3.7664
Docker 3.7506 (-0.4%)
Docker plus sysdig 3.7463 (-0.5%)
Table 5 shows the performance of Linpack jobs on
Linux, Docker and Docker plus Arhuaco monitoring. We
have executed one job per CPU core, for a total of 16 jobs
and have measured the resulting throughput. Figure 8 de-
scribes the results of the ALICE Grid job test. Up to 10 jobs
instances in parallel were executed. The measurement was
the execution time they spend to be completed. Each job
does the same tasks, simulation, reconstruction and analysis
of the same ALICE HEP data.
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Fig. 8 Performance impact comparison
The resulting throughput is almost identical for the 3
measured scenarios. This can be explained by the little in-
volvement the containers and system call monitoring have
in the floating point operations. For the execution time tests
with ALICE jobs, there was a maximum performance im-
pact of 8.634% when using Docker in comparison to the
Linux execution. This can be seen in the graphic when the
number of ALICE jobs in parallel is equal to 9. For the
Docker plus Arhuaco monitoring runs, the maximum perfor-
mance impact was of 2.535% in comparison to the Docker
runs (when the number of parallel jobs are equal to 7). It is
noticeable that there is not a big difference in using only
Docker containers in comparison to Docker and Arhuaco
monitoring. To further reduce the impact on the Grid jobs
performance of the system call monitoring method, we pro-
vide several configuration options: the first is to analyze only
Table 6 Classification accuracy and FPR comparison of testing data
Testing
Dataset CNN Acc. SVM Acc. CNN FPR SVM FPR
System
call 0.9657 0.9499 0.0632 0.0839
Network
traces 0.9733 0.8011 0.04004 0.0
a set of random jobs. The second option is to first analyze
only network data and then in case of suspicious behavior
activate the system calls collection. The third possibility is
a secure mode were all the data is analyzed, which is the
default mode.
6.3 Supervised classification results
Figure 9 and Figure 10 indicate the training and valida-
tion accuracy for the proposed Convolutional Neural Net-
work (CNN) and the compared Support Vector Machine
(SVM) on the analysis of system call traces, preprocessed
by word2vec and BoF. The CNN validation curve is close to
the training curve, approaching nearly 99%. Since the SVM
model is far smaller, a trend for over-fitting can be seen in
the validation curve compared to the training curve. Figure
11 and Figure 12 show a comparison for the ACC and FPR
with the validation data. Clearly, the CNN provides a higher
accuracy and lower False Positive Rate than the SVM.
Figure 13 and Figure 14 represent the the results for
the classification of network traces with our proposed CNN
and compared SVM method. As with the system calls case,
the CNN shows similar results with the training and valida-
tion data, approaching 99%. The SVM shows signs of over-
fitting and a lower accuracy. In Figures 15 and 16 we see
the comparison of the validation data for accuracy and False
Positive Rate. A better accuracy for the CNN is clear in this
case as well, however, the SVM exhibits a better FPR.
Table 6 summarizes the results obtained for applying
the Convolutional Neural Network and Support Vector Ma-
chines on previously unseen testing data. A better accu-
racy and False Positive Rates for the CNN over the SVM
is shown, except in the case of FPR for the network data.
This validates the results we have obtained in the training
steps and demonstrates the effectivenesses of using Convo-
lutional Neural Networks for classification in Arhauco to
detect intrusions, in comparison to utilizing Support Vector
Machines, the most popular method used in Grid computing
Intrusion Detection Systems.
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Fig. 9 Classification accuracy of the CNN applied to system calls
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Fig. 10 Classification accuracy of SVM applied to system calls
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Fig. 11 Accuracy comparison of CNN vs SVM applied to system calls
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Fig. 12 False Positive Rate comparison of CNN vs SVM applied to
system calls
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Fig. 13 Classification accuracy of CNN applied network data
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Fig. 14 Classification accuracy of SVM applied to network data
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Fig. 15 Classification accuracy comparison of CNN vs SVM applied
to network data
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Fig. 16 Classification False Positive Rate of CNN vs SVM applied to
network data
6.4 Generative model results
As shown in Table 6, the SVM classification results for net-
work connection information produced the worst accuracy
in all our tests. Therefore we utilized this same case to prove
the effectiveness of the proposed generative technique. The
Deep RNN was trained with the available network data cor-
pus and then modified to generate 20% new training data.
The new data was concatenated to the original data to create
a new training set. Further, the SVM is trained again to mea-
sure the new accuracy. The validation data utilized belongs
to the original data. Figures 17 and 18 provide a new com-
parison of the SVM accuracy and FPR after being trained
with the additionally generated data. A noticeable improve-
ment can be seen regarding the training with the original
data in Figures 15 and 16. This demonstrates the practical
benefits of using LSTM for modeling and generating data in
the context of Intrusion Detection Systems.
The obtained accuracy for the SVM trained with the
newly generated data, applied to unseen network data from
the original dataset was 0.8201. There was a 2.38% im-
provement rate as expected with our approach, in compar-
ison the original value from Table 6, 0.8011. This validates
the results obtained in the training steps.
7 Discusion and future work
Regarding the first question we have defined in our evalua-
tion, the performance tests present an execution time over-
head of 0.4% when using Linux Containers in comparison
with the Linux runs for the Linpack throughput test, and
0.5% when using Arhuaco monitoring. This can be consid-
ered as a very small impact. The impact is more considerable
when testing the execution time for the ALICE Grid job.
The Docker container generates up to 8.634% of overhead.
It is higher, an extra 2.535% when monitoring by Arhuaco
is added on top. Although this overhead is not critical, we
have implemented some ideas to reduce it. We have a two
layers approach, based on user configuration. Arhuaco can
detect malicious activities by first intercepting and analyzing
network connections and then it can make a deeper analysis
by a second layer using the system calls, after suspicious
processes detection. Another configurable option is to ran-
domly analyze a small set of jobs running in the Grid, which
still can contribute to have an improved level of security. It
is important to notice that containers are being increasingly
utilized in Grid computing collaborations and as we have
shown, adding extra monitoring and analysis by Arhuaco
creates an acceptable performance impact. Another point to
consider is that there are studies [13] that compare Linux
Containers against Virtual Machines (VMs). They demon-
strate that VMs create a bigger overhead in the performance
than LCs.
The classification algorithm implemented in Arhuaco
improves the detection of malicious activities running in-
side the grid, compared to traditionally employed methods,
which responds to the second research question. Convolu-
tional Neural Networks demonstrate a better classification
ability than Support Vector Machines for system calls as
well as for network connections in Grid jobs. Since our gath-
ered malicious network data is rather small, we have suc-
cessfully generated new data by a Recurrent Neural Net-
work. We described how it allowed us to improve the clas-
sification results for the SVM, giving an answer to the third
evaluation question. An interesting point to remark is that
our approach of analyzing input as a text data by Natu-
ral Language Processing approaches can be easily extended
from system calls and network data to inputs from other In-
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Fig. 17 Classification accuracy of SVM applied to network data with
the newly generated data for training
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Fig. 18 Classification False Positive Rate of SVM applied to network
data with the newly generated data for training
trusion Detection Systems or different sources of monitoring
data. It could also be easily adapted beyond HTC, for in-
stance to monitor Cloud services running in containers over
orchestration engines such as Kubernetes and Mesos.
We still have some limitations and topics for further
analysis. We will investigate optimizations that we can in-
troduce in Arhuaco for reducing the overhead. This seems
feasible given the results for Linpack. Our framework has
not been tested in a production environment yet. The ob-
tained False Positive Rate, although small, is still significant
if we consider the huge amount of jobs running in the World-
wide LHC Computing Grid, close to 300.000 at any given
instant. We should improve the results in this area and also
research into methods to inform about the possible security
incidents detected. We will explore techniques to protect the
privacy of our datasets in order to avoid leaks of sensitive
information. We will also investigate in how to employ the
distributed nature of the Grid to improve the distributed de-
tection of intrusions. This can be useful for instance, to au-
tonomously inform other Grid sites IDS about security in-
cidents that could spread in the Grid. We are working on
further enhancing the isolation provided in our containers
by using kernel hardening such as grsecurity. Besides we
are currently testing the integration with other container so-
lutions and HTC engines.
8 Conclusions
We have presented Arhuaco, a security monitoring tool for
High-Throughput Computing. It employs Security by Isola-
tion for executing and monitoring Grid jobs inside Linux
Containers based on multiple sources of monitoring data
such as network connections and system calls. It applies
Convolutional Neural Networks to classify Grid jobs data as
normal or malicious. It also utilizes a Recurrent Neural Net-
work to learn a data model in order to generate new training
samples. The proposed algorithms implemented in Arhuaco
improve the security incident detection in Grid computing
systems, since it is able to identify the source of an intru-
sion with higher accuracy. Arhuaco can analyze the huge
flow of real time data that monitoring Grid jobs generate.
This makes Arhuaco suitable for environments such as the
WLCG, the global Grid that analyzes data from the Large
Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN, where millions of jobs
are executed every day. By a set of tests carried out in the
ALICE Grid as part of the WLGC, we have shown how the
proposed algorithms outperform other methods used in In-
trusion Detection Systems for Grid Computing.
Datasets and software
Arhuaco is under development. We are discussing the pos-
sibility to release it and the training dataset as Open Source
software and data.
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